EWR ANALYSIS: IT'S THE SAUDI'S WAR TO LOSE The House of Saud appears implicated with Bin Laden at the highest levels Sue Lackey, Editor In Chief East West Record Sunday, October 21, 2001 The United States is at a distinct disadvantage in its War on Terrorism, because it is simply not in the American character to understand the subtle intrigue and internecine alliances that built and maintain the House of Saud; and it is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that this very old war is all about. An analysis of Osama bin Laden's carefully staged and pre-recorded response to American attacks on Kabul yields an important statement that was overlooked by the hurried Al Jazeera translation; bin Laden says that America will never feel secure as long as the infidel remains on the prophet's lands. America is a pawn in this game, and the end game is control of Saudi Arabia. The House of Saud is well aware of this, as they have faced this situation before. Not only is Saudi Arabia the ultimate target of bin Laden, it is increasingly evident that it may be bin Laden's main source of funding and intelligence. "All the trails," says a senior US intelligence official specializing in counter intelligence, "lead to a few people at the highest levels of the royal family in Saudi Arabia." US intelligence officials have always maintained that bin Laden's Al Qaeda network required assistance in gathering sophisticated intelligence for the World Trade Center bombings, assistance that could only be provided on a governmental level. Surveillance photos which showed bin Laden associates meeting with Iraqi intelligence officials initially led investigators to believe Saddam Hussein was involved. While they have not ruled that out, many now feel the trail leads directly to Prince Turki bin Faisal, Director of the Saudi Intelligence Service until his dismissal only a few weeks ago. (King Faisal was closely associated with Osama bin Laden's father, who initially supported the cause of the Mujahadeen.) Prince Turki bin Faisal has long been sympathetic to the cause of the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan, and sympathized with Osama bin Laden's fundamentalist views, particularly his objection to the presence of foreign (US) troops in the Kingdom during and after the Gulf War. Prince Turki made a number of trips to Afghanistan, once ostensibly to ask the Taliban to hand over bin Laden. But on more than one occasion, Turki's visits precipitated a sudden influx of cash and material to the Taliban. The Saudi government never seriously pressed for bin Laden's extradition. It was Prince Turki, as head of the Istakhbarat, who was in charge of the investigation into the Khobar Towers bombing in which bin Laden's involvement is acknowledged. Restrictions placed on the direct involvement of the FBI frustrated the investigation and left the US with an incomplete picture of what actually happened. Saudi government sources have hinted that Turki was ultimately dismissed over his handling of the investigation into a series of bombings that have targeted Westerners during the past year. Saudi royals also provided the money that first supported bin Laden in Afghanistan, and that continues to support him. Bin Laden permanently left Saudi Arabia for the Afghanistan in 1982 with a personal fortune estimated to be approximately $10 million-a far cry from his estimated worth today of well over $100 million. Since his first trip there in 1980, he had been actively soliciting Saudi funding for the cause, donating money and equipment to build military strongholds and infrastructure for at least five years before he appeared on the CIA's radar screen. While bin Laden receives considerable funding from numerous sources in the Kingdom sympathetic to his cause, it is believed to be Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, the powerful governor of Riyadh and brother to the King, who functions as his protector. "This is really a strategic mistake," says a respected Islamic scholar who has studied fundamentalist movements; "Saudi Arabia financed, either directly or indirectly through NGO's, all the Sunni Islamic movements in the last ten years. Now there is within the Royal family conflict, and such a division is seeing one group siding with the New Wahhabis, and they're not happy with their uncles and even their brothers in power. They are passing intelligence, passing information.even at some stages acting as liaison officers between the big shots of the Kingdom and [bin Laden's] people." As the United States begins to unravel the complicated financial trail left by the hijackers, it becomes clear just how many avenues there are for money to flow, untraced. Bin Laden owns a bank in the Sudan, which can easily be used as a conduit for money being laundered through legitimate businesses. The International Islamic Relief Organization has been accused of funneling Saudi money to militant Islamic movements, and Afghani representatives have been observed carrying cash into Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Money and materiel flows easily through the banks of Abu Dhabi and the port of Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates, where terrorists find it easy and convenient to slip in and out of Dubai's busy international airport. In the banking center of Beirut, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri recently stated there was no need to freeze funds belonging to terrorist organizations, as the banks in Lebanon were too small to engage in illegal money transfers. "We have no money laundering in this country," said Hariri, a statement the Lebanese find laughable in a country which has long prided itself on having bank secrecy laws rivaled only by the Swiss, and government ministers who grow rich in office. Hariri himself holds Saudi citizenship and has made millions through Saudi construction interests; it is highly unlikely he would closely scrutinize Saudi business dealings in Lebanon. In addition to an Al Qaeda presence in its refugee camps, Lebanon has a thriving, and well financed, Wahhabi community. Setting the stage for Bin Laden The Kingdom is not a kingdom at all, but a confederation of tribes and conflicting family powers. Its founder and father of the current leaders, Abdul Aziz al Saud, consolidated the peninsula by defeating local tribes, then marrying into them and paying off their leaders to gain their loyalty. The isolated populations of Arabia were mostly followers of the strict Wahhabi faction of Islam, and the most ferocious and dedicated warriors among them were the militant Ikhwan. Abdul Aziz al Saud had limited resources which the British doled out to him, and he needed an army to drive his Hashemite rivals from Mecca and the port of Jiddah. Portraying the capture of Mecca as a Holy cause, Abdul Aziz used the Ikhwan warriors as special forces, conquering Arabia and securing for himself the lucrative income from the pilgrimage. But ideological fanatics are difficult to control. The Ikhwan eventually turned on Abdul Aziz al Saud for his lack of adherence to their fundamentalist view of Islam. Abdul Aziz al Saud killed or imprisoned most of the Ikhwan leadership, but could not kill the movement. It is the precepts of the militant Ikhwan movement that define Osama bin Laden. This pattern of paying off enemies and maintaining ruthless internal control has served the nomadic tribes of Arabia for centuries, and it is what governs the actions of the House of Saud today. The tremendous wealth of the oil boom provided a pool of money that paid generous allowances to, and bought the loyalty of, thousands of members of the royal family. In the same way, the Saudis have been a bottomless well of cash support to radical and fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movements throughout the world, asking only one thing in return-do whatever you want, but stay out of the Kingdom. The House of Saud also developed sophisticated publishing and communications empires, controlling the most respected Arab newspapers, Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq al-Awsad. These newspapers are known for their excellent journalistic standards of reporting on all areas of the Arab world, except on negative issues affecting the Kingdom, where they are strictly controlled. Qatar, another Wahhabi emirate, controls Al Jazeera television network, which was rumored to have been initially funded by the CIA. Al Jazeera been praised in the past for its coverage, but is now the chosen media outlet for bin Laden's press communiqués. Through its publishing empire, the Kingdom covers the cause of Palestinian resistance, rallying street opinion around the intifada and deflecting attention from its own internal dissent. Osama bin Laden has adopted this same tactic, portraying himself as a leader in the fight against Israeli oppression of the Palestinians, and therefore a leader of the entire Islamic movement. His support of the Palestinian intifada has manifested itself in words more than it has in cash and deeds. By striking American targets, bin Laden can portray his movement as striking a blow against Israel; in this way he can popularize himself on the "street", when what he really intends is to weaken America's taste for involvement in the Middle East, and therefore remove the US support of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden's harsh and puritanical view of Islam has little ideological appeal to the Palestinians; he seeks instead their support as a folk hero. The Saudi penchant for using and paying off militant Islamic movements is ingrained in the tribal mentality of the Kingdom. In the case of the Ikhwan, they have used them when it suited (against the Hashemites at the turn of the century, and in Afghanistan in the 1980's), carefully maintaining enough control to enable them to eliminate the fundamentalists when their purpose had been served. In the case of Bin Laden, he has not only turned on his masters, he possesses embarrassing knowledge that could implicate the Royal family at very high levels and threaten the Kingdom's most lucrative alliance with the West. For this reason, the Saudis may want bin Laden dead even more than the US does. In the case of both Abdul Aziz and his son King Fahd, the Ikhwan have turned on the House of Saud, who they perceive as not sufficiently pious to control the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Abdul Aziz al Saud succeeded in killing many of his Ikhwan fighters. King Khalid did the same when a band of militants laid siege to the Al Haram Mosque at Mecca in 1979. King Fahd, however, may not be so lucky. The House of Saud is plagued by internal dissent, on the street and in the Palace. Bin Laden is using this dissent as leverage to topple the House of Saud. Fahd's princely rivals are using Bin Laden to maneuver their own personal power to advantage once the ailing King dies. But bin Laden's clever manipulation of street opinion, at the height of a confluence of world events that make the Middle East a powder keg, may prove to be the most serious challenge the Kingdom has ever faced. "They [the House of Saud] have used all means to justify staying in power;" says an Islamic scholar; " now they have gotten to the last bullet and the last bullet is their legitimacy versus their perception of Islam. Whether we like it or not, this is a clash of civilizations. The last stand for them is to go to the streets and do massive arrest and crack down on all Islamic movements, and you cannot do that. A brother in Wahhabism is a brother in Wahhabism.you cannot kill him." What lies ahead What the Kingdom fears most is an upheaval such as occurred in Iran in 1979; in order for the House of Saud to fall, total revolution would have to occur. That is highly unlikely, as the brothers have been very careful to spread control of the military throughout the family in order to prevent a coup. What is likely is a major shift in the alliances of the most powerful princes. Abdullah, the Crown Prince, is a conservative man. He may see this as his chance to move towards a more conservative Islamic governance, and may ask US troops to leave the Kingdom in order to quell internal dissent and remove bin Laden's raison d'être. Strategically, this would not be as damaging to US interests in the Gulf as might be thought. The three militarily strategic locations in the Gulf are already being utilized by the US-Yemen, where naval ships can easily refuel; Oman, which controls access to the straits of Hormuz; and Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is based. Access to airfields in the UAE and Kuwait, and use of aircraft carriers in the Arabian Gulf, could essentially duplicate any strategic advantage gained by remaining in Saudi Arabia. A shift in alliances among the Royal family would also not be likely to drive oil prices up. These are precarious times economically for the Kingdom, and the last thing it wants is to cut off oil income from its most lucrative customer. Now, more than ever, the House of Saud needs cash to placate internal dissent and prevent economically fueled domestic unrest. Similarly, raising oil prices dramatically could force the US to look elsewhere. The US has been making tentative overtures to Iran, and the possibility always remains for normalization of relations with Iraq, and access to its oil fields. Staunch US ally Turkey would be strongly in favor of that, as Turkey's income has been badly hit by trading sanctions with Iraq. More importantly, the US needs to consider exactly what it is willing to tolerate from its so-called ally. Should the FBI receive concrete proof that intelligence was flowing from Prince Turki to bin Laden with the knowledge of the rulers-even if such a transfer did not have their official sanction-America will find itself in a very awkward position. The decision as to what to do with that information will be made by an administration that rose to wealth and political power on Big Oil. The tiny and elite world of the oil rich often crosses paths with less savory aspects of wealth. Look at any US oil company, such as both Presidents Bush and Vice President Cheney are involved with, and tangled financial trails lead to Abu Dhabi's corrupt BCCI, which channeled money to terrorists and CIA slush funds before it collapsed; or to Texan James R. Bath, whose financial investments for questionable BCCI-connected Saudis ultimately provided financing for Bush family oil interests. Will the President be able to turn his back on the wealthy Republican oil interests that brought him to power? Like the Royal family of Saudi Arabia, he is in a precarious position. If George Bush's approval ratings among the American public remain high, he may feel confident enough in re-election to make the information public. If he elects to cover any possible Saudi involvement up, even if he is motivated by the best interests of US foreign policy, he will irreparably harm the already damaged US stature in the Middle East. Sue Lackey is Editor-in-Chief of EWR