Whether Uzbekistan should allow religious parties or not is an important and difficult question. In this essay, I look at the pros and cons of legalizing religious parties for the sake of stability in Uzbekistan. Although the formation of religious parties has some considerable advantages, this essay argues that the formation of religious parties should not currently be allowed in Uzbekistan.

In this paper, a religious party is understood as a party that rejects the secular state and/or wants to introduce the law of Islam (Shari'yat). 'Stability', as understood in this essay, does not exclude reform, as long as the change is brought about in a peaceful manner. I will start with outlining the challenge that illegal Islamic groups pose to the government of Uzbekistan, then describe the advantages and disadvantages of allowing religious parties and, finally, provide policy recommendations.

Some Islamic groups present a significant opposition to the government and use violence to achieve their goals. Three major incidents illustrate the Islamic challenge: In August 1999, the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" took thirteen hostages including four Japanese geologists in. Initially they demanded the release of 50,000 Muslim held in Uzbek prisons and the reopening of thousands of mosques and religious training institutions. Officials said the gunmen want to carve out an Islamic state on territories now belonging to three Central Asian nations, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.'

In February 1999, President Karimov survived only by chance one of six sophisticated bombing attacks in Tashkent, in which 15 people died and 150 were injured. The movement Hezbi Takhrir Islamiya, which aims to create an Islamic Caliphate, claimed responsibility for the first bombings in 80 years in Uzbekistan. Indeed two weeks earlier Karimov spoke of a security threat stemming from the Hezbi Takhrir Islamiya (Ruttig 1999: 10).

In December 1997, some senior government officials and police officers were murdered in Namangan. The government accuses Wahabies (Ruttig 1999: 10), graduates of schools run by the revivalist movement. This Islamic group aims to build Musulman-abad, the land of Islam, integrating the whole Muslim world. The society would be ruled by the ulama and the Shari'yat would rule over the relations between people. The revivalist movement was already creating illegal schools in the 1970s. Some schools were made legal by the end of 1989. Already by the end of the 1990, the revivalist movement had established an Islamic militia. Thus, the revivalist movement is not a temporary phenomenon but rather an established group (Abduvakhitov 1994: 73-74).

The challenge these groups pose for the government of Uzbekistan requires addressing the question whether religious parties should be allowed. Several very different reasons suggest that religious parties should be legalized: First, if the above mentioned Islamic militants had the chance to compete with their ideas in a democracy, they might either not use violence or, at least, find (even) fewer followers or silent approval by the people. If religious parties were allowed, notorious militants would get less popular support or approval by arguing that the state is too secular. The prohibition of religious parties provides, to a certain degree, militant Islamists with legitimacy in the eyes of some people since these groups have no legal way to pursue their political goals.

Second, criticism and protest at the government would be channeled in Peaceful political debates rather than into militant means.

Third, if members of religious parties were elected, the parliament might have a positive effect on the former militant Islamists, encouraging them to restrain from both the use of violence and from their radical political ideas. The good salary which members of parliament receive contributes to the mainstreaming of political ideas and the methods to pursue them.

Fourth, religious groups might be better observed by the state if they are operating as legal parties rather than clandestine organizations. Bennigsen and Wimbush (1985: 74) write that the KGB failed to penetrate the Sufi orders sufficiently to learn their 'secrets.' The same might be true today for many religious groups.

Fifth, the oppression of religious groups which results from preventing the formation of religious parties might, in fact, strengthen these religious groups. They gain their strength and support not from offering solutions to actual economical or political problems but through the discrimination from the government. Haghayeghi (1995: 1.) cites Lunachbarski saying: "Religion is like a nail; the more you hit it, the deeper it goes in." This applies to religious parties as well. The more religious groups are excluded from politics, the more committed their members become and the more popular support they get. If they are allowed to participate in politics, however, they will probably fail to solve actual problems and loose their popular support.

Sixth, religious parties could provide an effective stimulus for the government to perform better, and, at the same time, they could work as safety valves for social discontent.

Seventh, a democratic state should offer as much political freedom as possible, i.e. while guaranteeing the preservation of democracy. In an extreme democratic view, the people deserve the government they elect. If the voters elect an irresponsible government, they do not deserve any better. The observance of Islamic rituals was already on the increase in Soviet times, as Bennigsen and Wimbush (1985: 86) argue. Thus, if the people want religious parties, they should have them.

Despite these considerable arguments in favor of the admission of religious parties, there are far more convincing arguments against it in order to keep the country stable. First, Islam does not have a single political ideology, but many. Although most Uzbeks are Sunnis, a considerable number of Moslems are Sufis. In addition, even among the Sunnis there are various understandings of the role of Islam in politics. To allow the establishment of religious parties does not only mean more competition for secular parties, but also competition among the religious parties and quarrels among their followers about the right interpretation of Islam for politics.

If one religious group forms a political party then other religious groups might feel threatened and begin to organize themselves. To allow a Wahabit group to form a political party r.ught lead to a centralization and pol;.ticization of the so far decentralized, tolerant, relatively 'liberal' Naqshabandiya Sufis. The Wahabies consider Sufism as heresy. A potential rise of Wahabies might lead to defensive measures of the Sufls. In other words: to legalize one religious group as a party triggers conflicts within the Muslims. If Islam is applied in politics, it will not promote a unifying identity but rather lead to disintegration of the Muslim Uzbeks. Besides, 12% of the Uzbek population are not Muslims after all (CIA Factbook 1999).

Second, it is highly questionable whether the militant Islamists have any support from a significant share of the Uzbek population at all. According to an opinion poll 71% of the Uzbeks consider their political situation as 'somewhat' or 'very' good, and 94% think that they have greater freedom of religion than before independence (Geran Pilon 1998: 94). The Muslims of Uzbekistan, and all other Central Asian states, are accustomed to secular leaders and secular politics. The separation of politics and religion is not new and was not questioned in Soviet times. The Naqshbandiya Sufi Order, the main Sufi brotherhood in Central Asia, was relatively tolerant of the political and social life in the Soviet Union, argue Bennigsen and Wimbush (I 985: 1 1). Thus, there is no reason to believe that the Sufis currently want a further Islamicization of society.

In addition, drugs are a major economic factor and play a significant role in politics in the Ferghana valley and the surrounding region. Perhaps the drug Mafia supports some of the above mentioned militant Islamic groups in order to destabilize the Central Asian states and create even better conditions for drug production and trafficking. If this is the case, the legalization of religious parties will not solve the problem of Islamic militancy. The militant groups would continue to recruit people successfully by corrupting them with the enormous drug money. They do not depend on the support of devoted Muslim believers who want to change society but, rather, buy their support with drug money.

Third, some Islamic fundamentalists might refuse to participate in democracy as they reject the secular principle of democracy and/or the secular state, which hosts democracy. Moreover, some Islamic militants might not be interested in gaining power through democratic means, but believe in terrorism as the shortcut to establishing an Islamic state.

Fourth, without some influential secular parties and a strong civil society it is too risky to allow religious parties. Only such a counterbalance guarantees (to the extent this is possible at all) that religious parties will not do much harm but, rather, absorb the popular pressure. This counterbalance needs to be created before religious parties can be allowed. So far, however, only a few secular opposition parties are allowed in Uzbekistan and they do not have much freedom compared to the other Central Asian states. Uzbekistan's civil society is weak for two reasons:

First, the strengthening of the state authority (including human rights violations) in the face of what the government fears could become destructive internal forces retards the development of civil society. Although the establishment of NGOs is permitted by now and "several hundred independent groups [in Central Asia] are doing heroic work in such areas as poor relief, medical care, and women's concerns", the articulation of these concerns by responsible and effective political groups at the national level is lacking (Starr 1999a?: 5). In addition, Geran Pilon (1998: 98) writes: "the bulk of the population [in Central Asia] is still largely ignorant about the meaning, role, and context of NGOS."

Second, Uzbekistan's use of the Mahalla system for providing social assistance management may in the long run "impede the development of civil society as they could inhibit enterprise, impede labor mobility, retard individuation, and - most importantly to the development of civil society - discourage the formation of groups and associations not directly controlled by the neighborhood organization itself' (Starr 1999b?: 15). Besides, the strong role of the Mahalla in (local) politics already presents a considerable concession tct the supporters of a stronger role of Islam in politics as Mahallas are organized around the mosques and Islamic values. However, the separation between the Mahalla committee as the 'secular' body and the mosque as the spiritual body, ensures that religion does not influence politics too much.

In my opinion, the challenges Islamism poses should not be met by allowing religious parties right now but, rather, by supporting secular parties and civil society and respecting human rights - even in face of terrorism. The government should not react to terrorism by arresting political activists who might have nothing to do with the crimes and other repressive measures towards the opposition. To increase its legitimacy and secure the country's stability, Uzbekistan's government should not allow religious parties right now but, rather, deal with terrorism and kidnappers in a fair and transparent way so that ordinary people do not sympathize with militants.

1 On October 16th, Reuters quoted unnamed Kyrgyz government sources as saying that the gunmen are demanding a $2 million ransom for the four Japanese. Except for the geologists' interpreter, all other Kyrgyz have already been freed. On October 19'h, Reuters quotes a Tajik minister who said that the Japanese would be freed soon without any ransoms being paid. While the number of 50,000 imprisoned political prisoners seems intolerably high, it is also surprising that the gunmen changed their demand to $2 million, which does not make them a credible Islamic force. (http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/central/9910/19/bc.tajikistan.kyrgyzstan.gunmen.reut/index.html, http://www.soros.org/uzbkstan/omri/0336.html, http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/central/9909/07/bc.kyrgyzstanjapan.reut)