Culture & Ideas 10/1/01
Fight to the Finish
Has
a 'clash of civilizations' threatened 'the end of
history'?
BY JAY TOLSON
Americans now have at least an idea of who
the enemy is: a network of terrorists who may or may
not have the support of one or more nations. But there
is another question, with potentially greater
implications for U.S. foreign policy: What are
we fighting?
Terrorism alone is a complicated challenge, of course.
Defeating it, experts say, will require the same
sustained commitment needed for fighting a
conventional war, along with a shrewd appreciation of
how it differs from a classic military operation.
Without drawing these subtle distinctions, says Martha
Crenshaw, a professor of government at Wesleyan
University and a terrorism specialist, "you are
likely to create expectations . . . that might be
impossible to meet: What is victory? And when does it
arrive?" To balance the desire for revenge and
justice with the need for lasting security, two
objectives should be utmost, Crenshaw says: "In
the short run, we have to crack down on the networks;
in the long run, we have to drain the swamps that
spawned them."
And to drain those swamps, Washington has to know
what it is fighting–a question that goes to the
heart of the two most provocative theories on global
politics after the Cold War, published in articles by
Francis Fukuyama ("The End of History?") and
Samuel Huntington ("The Clash of
Civilizations?").
Writing in the same year as the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Fukuyama, then a State Department official,
argued that the end of the Cold War signaled the
approaching end of "mankind's ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government."
In other words, the West had won. There would be blips
on the screen, he allowed, and temporary setbacks in
different parts of the world, but the path to an
essentially harmonious global political economy was
set.
Not too long after Fukuyama outlined his scenario,
Huntington, a professor of government at Harvard,
issued a far more ominous forecast. The passing of the
Cold War had brought an end to serious competition
among nation-states, but it had also launched an era
of growing competition among the world's major
civilizations. Where once ideologies had been the
points of conflict, now religion, ethnicity, and
cultural values were. "Most important," he
wrote, "the efforts of the West to promote its
values of democracy and liberalism as universal
values, to maintain its military predominance, and to
advance its economic interests engender countering
responses from other civilizations." The stage
for epic struggles–the West versus the rest–had
been set. And none loomed more menacingly than the one
between the West and the Islamic world.
So, then, in the still-smoky aftermath of the
horrors, has Huntington been vindicated and Fukuyama
disproved? Huntington has so far declined to comment,
but Fukuyama remains guardedly hopeful. "In
general, the Muslim world has had the most problems
with modernizing," he says, "but even there
the modernizing trends are strong." At the same
time, Fukuyama cautions, "A lot depends on how
the administration responds."
To many Islamic specialists, even suggesting that
the current conflict is a clash between civilizations
is handing victory to the terrorists. To Osama bin
Laden, who in 1998 declared that his struggle was a
continuation of the struggle against infidel Crusaders
of the Middle Ages, nothing sounds sweeter than
President Bush using the word "crusade" to
describe America's intentions. It confirms, in his own
eyes and those of his followers, bin Laden's sense of
himself as a modern-day Saladin–the sultan of Egypt
and Syria who captured Jerusalem and defended it
during the Third Crusade.
Islam versus Islam. Some scholars say the
battle lines are different: "It's not Islam
versus the West as much as it is Islam versus
Islam," says Akbar Ahmed, former Pakistani
ambassador to the United Kingdom and professor of
Islamic studies at American University in Washington,
D.C. Ahmed calls for what he terms a more Islamic
response to the radical fringe. Many Islamic
extremists (like many American commentators) equate
globalism with Americanism and Westernization, for
example, ignoring the Koran's own words: "There
is neither East nor West for God." They also fail
to acknowledge, Ahmed says, the long history of Muslim
interaction with disparate religious cultures. Other
scholars go even further, saying that extremism denies
the spiritual richness and diversity within
Islam, ignoring the Prophet's own call for tolerance.
While there are many variants of extreme Islam,
most share qualities with a movement launched by an
18th-century scholar, Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who
lived in central Arabia and found a receptive ear in
the Saud family, which in 1932 became the ruling
dynasty of the new kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Claiming
to return to original Islam, Wahhabism rejected all
innovations, stressed literal belief in the Koran and
hadith (the traditions of Mohammed), and called for
the creation of a state run strictly according to
Islamic law. Most threateningly, says Sheik Hisham
Kabbani, chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of
America, the fundamentalists "considered
traditional Muslims apostates," a judgment that
the Prophet had said no mortal should make. The
Prophet had foreseen that there would be many
divergent practices within Islam, Kabbani notes, but
said only God could judge which version is true.
Islamic civilization continued to spread and
diversify. But the European nations' surrender of
their colonies during the first half of the 20th
century left the newly independent Islamic nations
throughout North Africa and the Middle East with great
challenges. Without democratic traditions, all
acquired autocratic regimes of one kind or another.
Their intellectuals and elites, meanwhile, tended to
embrace the secularism of their former colonizers in
their quest for modernity and progress. Religious
practice and scholarship were neglected, and the
rulers increasingly cracked down on their critics.
Into this era of ferment came the Jewish state of
Israel, which arose in the center of the Levant. One
of its primary supporters, the United States, became a
major player in the region, more than once having its
way by supporting or installing unsavory regimes.
Social justice. Thus the region became ripe
for movements (particularly fundamentalist ones)
promising social justice and ethnic solidarity. And
all the better if they painted Uncle Sam as the Great
Satan, the wicked meddler in local affairs. But the
notion that the United States is the decisive factor
behind the rise of fanatical Islam–or of the terror
it inspires–is absurd, as Richard Cohen noted in the
Washington Post. Even as Washington attempted
to broker a settlement between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, bin Laden's associates carried
out their attacks on U.S. embassies and the USS Cole.
If there is a failing within Ameri- ca's
foreign-policy establishment, says Charles Fairbanks,
a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, it is that it needs to figure
religion more seriously into the geopolitical
equation: "It's in the interest of the United
States and other countries to try to encourage the
recovery of traditional Islamic religious
learning." Sheik Kabbani concurs, adding that
it's the fanatics who "now have the mike."
But to be helpful, Americans need a rudimentary
knowledge of Islamic traditions and teaching so that
they will know who should get aid, and who should not.
At present, says Kabbani, some extremists "are
getting support even from the regimes they are trying
to destroy." If the United States and other
nations do not help the traditionalist Muslims win the
theological struggle within Islamic civilization, then
the West may face what the extremists want: a real and
possibly cataclysmic clash between civilizations.