A New Approach to the Middle East

William Kristol's prepared testimony for the May 22, 2002 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia.

May 28, 2002

SINCE THE END of World War II, the United States has regarded the al-Saud regime as a friend, or an ally, or at least a partner for stability in the Middle East. After September 11, it is time to call this assumption into question. It is time for the United States to rethink its relationship with Riyadh. For we are now at war--at war with terror and its sponsor, radical Islam. And in this war, the Saudi regime is more part of the problem than part of the solution

The case for reevaluating our strategic partnership with the current Saudi regime is a strong one. Begin with the simple fact that 15 of the 19 participants in the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals. That's something the Saudis themselves could not initially admit. A large proportion--perhaps as high as 80 percent, according to some reports--of the "detainees" taken from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay are Saudis. And although Osama bin Laden has made much of his antipathy to the Saudi regime, his true relationship with the royal family is certainly more complex and questionable. The Saudis refused, despite the urgings of the Clinton Administration, to take him into custody in 1996 when Sudan offered to deliver him.

The Saudis also have been deeply implicated in the wave of suicide bombers that have attacked Israeli citizens--and American citizens in Israel--in recent years. Again, initial Saudi official reaction has been to deny the link. Even as documents captured by Israel in its spring offensive against the Palestinian Authority revealed the Saudi role, the kingdom's ambassador to the United States denounced as "baseless" any suggestion that Saudi money "goes to evildoers." The Israelis, Prince Bandar complained, were engaged in a "shameful and counterproductive" attempt to discredit his family "which has been a leading voice for peace." The charge "that Saudi Arabia is paying suicide bombers" is "totally false," he said.

The prince's claim is proven false not simply by the documents discoveredby Israel but by the Saudi government's own press releases. One from January 2001 boasts how the "Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Quds Intifada", headed and administered by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, the kingdom's
interior minister, has distributed $33 million to "deserving Palestinians"including "the families of 2,281 prisoners and 358 martyrs." Other releases from subsequent months detailed further payments to Palestinian "martyrs" totaling tens of millions of dollars. Public announcements in Palestinian newspapers have given instructions on how to receive payments from the intifada committee. And the documents make clear the close connection between the Saudis and the terrorist Hamas organization in particular.

But even more important than funding terrorist acts has been the Saudi regime's general and aggressive export of Wahhabi fundamentalism. "Saudi Arabia," writes Michael Vlahos of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, has "sought to make Islam a sort of wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Saud family." Wahhabi teachings, religious schools and Saudi oil money have encouraged young Muslims in countries around the world to a jihad-like incitement against non-Muslims. The combination of Wahhabi ideology and Saudi money has contributed more to the radicalization and
anti-Americanization of large parts of the Islamic world than any other single factor.

It has taken something like willful ignorance on the part of successive American administrations to ignore such developments or explain them away, and to maintain the fiction that the Saudis are our "strategic partners." Clinton National Security Adviser Sandy Berger lamented--once safely out
of office--that "the veil has been lifted [from over U.S.-Saudi relations] and the American people see a double game they're not terribly pleased with." Brent Scowcroft, always cautious, admitted, "We [Americans and Saudis] probably avoid talking about the things that are the real problems between us because it's a very polite relationship. We don't get all that much below the surface." Former Secretary of State George Shultz bluntly terms the traditional U.S.-Saudi relationship "a grotesque protection racket."

Clearly, the long tradition of quiet diplomacy with the Saudi monarchy no longer serves American purposes. The royal family has taken silence as consent in its strategy of directing Arab and Islamic discontent away from the House of Saud and toward the United States, Israel and the West.
This is a strategy inimical to American security and a dangerously crippling problem in President Bush's war on terrorism.

The first step in fashioning a realistic American policy toward Saudi Arabia is understanding the nature of the Saudi regime. We should begin by a public, detailed and thorough investigation--perhaps initiated by this committee--into the Saudi role in the events of September 11. This should be a broad investigation, addressing the ideological preparation, financing and recruitment of terrorists eager to commit suicidal attacks. Congress should not be deterred in this by any concurrent investigations by the Justice Department.

Public knowledge can then be the basis for public diplomacy. Only by applying pressure can we encourage whatever modernizing movement there may be within the royal family and the armed forces while isolating the radical Wahhabi clerics and their supporters. Prince Abdullah is sometimes seen as a reformer. We should give him every incentive to reform the current Saudi regime, and the main such incentive would be to tell him, privately and publicly, that the status quo is unacceptable.

Beyond speaking truth to the House of Saud and encouraging modernization within Saudi Arabia, the United States should demand that the Saudis stop financing and encouraging radical and extreme Wahhabism, beginning with mosques and charities in the United States but extending also throughout
the Islamic world, including Pakistan, Afghanistan and other trouble spots. Given its role in providing a breeding ground for anti-American terror, the export of Wahhabism is a clear and present danger to the United States and its citizens. In general, we must make clear that the Saudis can no longer play both sides of the fence. What President Bush has demanded of others--to cut off all support for terrorists and to stand with the United States--applies also to Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, it is clear that we cannot base our strategy for the region on the hope that the Saudis will moderate their behavior to suit our interests. To the Saudis we have been, at best, allies of convenience, shielding them from other would-be regional hegemons with greater conventional military strength, larger populations and more diverse economies. The Saudi desire to create a caliphate of money and religious extremism depends upon an unwitting American partner.

So in addition to hoping for and encouraging change from within Saudi Arabia, we should develop strategic alternatives to reliance on Riyadh. In the military sphere, we have already begun to hedge, with agreements and deployments to other Gulf emirates. Although still the strongest influence on oil prices, other sources--in Russia, the Caspian Basin, Mexico and elsewhere--can be developed and brought to market at a reasonable cost. The attacks of September 11 remind us that it is not just what we pay at the pump but what we pay in lives, security and international political stability that comprise the true price of Saudi oil.

In particular, removing the regime of Saddam Hussein and helping construct a decent Iraqi society and economy would be a tremendous step toward reducing Saudi leverage. Bringing Iraqi oil fully into world markets would improve energy economics. From a military and strategic perspective, Iraq is more
important than Saudi Arabia. And building a representative government in Baghdad would demonstrate that democracy can work in the Arab world. This, too, would be a useful challenge to the current Saudi regime.

In sum, we should not be attempting to preserve our past relationship with Saudi Arabia but rather forging a new approach to the greater Middle East. We have learned at great cost that Persian Gulf dictators, be they in Tehran, Baghdad or Riyadh, are shaky partners at best and cause major problems at worst. In the future we must find an alternative--either through reform in Saudi Arabia and/or the fostering of other relationships with truer allies--to a Saudi regime that funds and foments terror.